Results: 4
The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not.
- Published in:
- Economics of Governance, 2001, v. 2, n. 3, p. 173, doi. 10.1007/PL00011026
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games.
- Published in:
- Economics of Governance, 2001, v. 2, n. 3, p. 203, doi. 10.1007/PL00011025
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players.
- Published in:
- Economics of Governance, 2001, v. 2, n. 3, p. 231, doi. 10.1007/PL00011027
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills.
- Published in:
- Economics of Governance, 2001, v. 2, n. 3, p. 243, doi. 10.1007/PL00011028
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article