Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 651, doi. 10.1007/s10058-022-00289-4
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
Works matching IS 14344742 AND DT 2022 AND VI 26 AND IP 4
Results: 10
1
2
Mechanism design by observant and informed planners.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 665, doi. 10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
3
Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 581, doi. 10.1007/s10058-022-00321-7
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- Publication type:
- Article
4
On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results.
- Published in:
- 2022
- By:
- Publication type:
- Literature Review
5
Computational implementation.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 605, doi. 10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
6
Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 679, doi. 10.1007/s10058-022-00323-5
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
7
A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 553, doi. 10.1007/s10058-022-00297-4
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
8
Stability of an allocation of objects.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 561, doi. 10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
9
Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 635, doi. 10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z
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- Publication type:
- Article
10
An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2022, v. 26, n. 4, p. 543, doi. 10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article