Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 3, p. 191, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0127-9
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
Works matching IS 14344742 AND DT 2005 AND VI 9 AND IP 3
Results: 5
1
2
Entry deterrence under financial intermediation with private information and hidden contracts.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 3, p. 203, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0128-8
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- Publication type:
- Article
3
Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 3, p. 271, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0130-1
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- Publication type:
- Article
4
Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling.
- Published in:
- 2005
- By:
- Publication type:
- Correction Notice
5
Externalities do not necessarily require larger message spaces for realizing pareto-efficient allocations.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 3, p. 227, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0129-7
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article