Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 1997, v. 3, n. 1, p. 1, doi. 10.1007/s100580050001
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
Works matching IS 14344742 AND DT 1997 AND VI 3 AND IP 1
Results: 6
1
2
Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 1997, v. 3, n. 1, p. 57, doi. 10.1007/PL00013687
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
3
The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 1997, v. 3, n. 1, p. 15, doi. 10.1007/PL00013686
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- Publication type:
- Article
4
Redistribution and individual characteristics.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 1997, v. 3, n. 1, p. 45, doi. 10.1007/PL00013684
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
5
Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 1997, v. 3, n. 1, p. 29, doi. 10.1007/PL00013685
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article
6
Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 1997, v. 3, n. 1, p. 75, doi. 10.1007/s100580050006
- By:
- Publication type:
- Article