On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers.Published in:Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, v. 24, n. 3, p. 177, doi. 10.1007/s10602-013-9143-xBy:Congleton, RogerPublication type:Article
Independent central banks as a component of the separation of powers.Published in:Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, v. 24, n. 3, p. 199, doi. 10.1007/s10602-013-9142-yBy:Bernholz, PeterPublication type:Article
Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls.Published in:Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, v. 24, n. 3, p. 215, doi. 10.1007/s10602-013-9141-zBy:Potrafke, NiklasPublication type:Article
The constitutional political economy of virtual worlds.Published in:Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, v. 24, n. 3, p. 239, doi. 10.1007/s10602-013-9140-0By:Mildenberger, CarlPublication type:Article