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STATUTES AND SPECIAL INTERESTS.Published in:Northwestern University Law Review, 2025, v. 119, n. 5, p. 1367By:Carlson, Kirsten MatoyPublication type:Article
THE MARKET VALUE OF PARTISAN BALANCE.Published in:Northwestern University Law Review, 2025, v. 119, n. 5, p. 1201By:Feinstein, Brian D.;Hemel, Daniel J.Publication type:Article
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN RETAILERS' WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT RETURNS: A FIELD STUDY.Published in:Northwestern University Law Review, 2025, v. 119, n. 5, p. 1135By:Furth-Matzkin, MeiravPublication type:Article