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A Revision of the Buechner–Tavani Model of Digital Trust and a Philosophical Problem It Raises for Social Robotics.
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- Information (2078-2489), 2020, v. 11, n. 1, p. 48, doi. 10.3390/info11010048
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- Article
USING KREISEL'S WAY OUT TO REFUTE LUCAS-PENROSE-PUTNAM ANTI-FUNCTIONALIST ARGUMENTS.
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- Semiotic Studies / Studia Semiotyczne, 2020, v. 34, n. 1, p. 109, doi. 10.26333/sts.xxxiv1.06
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- Article
Two New Philosophical Problems for Robo-Ethics.
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- Information (2078-2489), 2018, v. 9, n. 10, p. 256, doi. 10.3390/info9100256
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- Article
Does Kripke’s Argument Against Functionalism Undermine the Standard View of What Computers Are?
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- Minds & Machines, 2018, v. 28, n. 3, p. 491, doi. 10.1007/s11023-018-9466-5
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- Article
'Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going?'.
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- 2017
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- Book Review
Trust and multi-agent systems: applying the 'diffuse, default model' of trust to experiments involving artificial agents.
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- Ethics & Information Technology, 2011, v. 13, n. 1, p. 39, doi. 10.1007/s10676-010-9249-z
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- Article
Artificial moral agents: saviors or destroyers?
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- 2010
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- Publication type:
- Book Review
Are the Gödel incompleteness theorems limitative results for the neurosciences?
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- Journal of Biological Physics, 2010, v. 36, n. 1, p. 23, doi. 10.1007/s10867-009-9160-1
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- Article