Title

An Epistemic Injustice Critique of Austin's Ordinary Language Epistemology.

Authors

Pearlman, Savannah

Abstract

J. L. Austin argues that ordinary language should be used to identify when it is appropriate or inappropriate to make, accept, or reject knowledge claims. I criticize Austin's account. In our ordinary life, we often accept justifications rooted in racism, sexism, ableism, and classism as reasons to dismiss knowledge claims or challenges, despite the fact such reasons are not good reasons. Austin's Ordinary Language Epistemology (OLE) inadvertently classifies the discounting of knowledge claims in classic cases of epistemic injustice as legitimate ordinary maneuvers. I provide recommendations for revision of OLE and offer a means of distinguishing between dismissals in cases of epistemic injustice and their legitimate counterparts.

Subjects

ABLEISM; CLASSISM; DISMISSAL & nonsuit; SEXISM; THEORY of knowledge

Publication

Hypatia, 2024, Vol 39, Issue 2, p322

ISSN

0887-5367

Publication type

Academic Journal

DOI

10.1017/hyp.2023.111