Title

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics.

Authors

Chow, Yunshyong

Abstract

This paper studies the long run behavior in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. All players are assumed to sit around a circle and to interact only with their neighbors. It is known that full-defection is the unique long run equilibrium as the probability of players' experimentation (or mutation) tends to zero in the best response dynamics. Here, it is shown that full-cooperation could emerge in the long run if one also cares for his neighbors in the best-response dynamics.

Subjects

MARKOV processes; STOCHASTIC processes; WIENER processes; DYNAMICS; STATIONARY states (Quantum mechanics)

Publication

Frontiers of Mathematics in China, 2015, Vol 10, Issue 4, p839

ISSN

1673-3452

Publication type

Academic Journal

DOI

10.1007/s11464-015-0478-7