The Consistency of Plato’s Treatment of Rhetoric.

Garcia Dotto, Pedro Mauricio

Commentators of Plato tend to assume that the philosopher changed his perception of rhetoric over time. Generally, such commentators focus on the critiques against rhetoric in the Gorgias and the claim of a philosophical rhetoric in the Phaedrus to display a fundamental discontinuity in Plato’s treatment of rhetoric. In contrast, I aim to demonstrate a fundamental continuity of Plato’s considerations on rhetoric, supplanting the textual evidence commonly analyzed in this debate with some passages from the Apology, Symposium, and Laws. Both in an early dialogue, such as the Apology, and in a much later one, such as the Laws, the same procedure is at work: a careful distinction between genuine rhetoric and its counterfeits. If rhetoric allies itself with philosophy, turns into a τέχνη, and is guided by the truth and the good, Plato embraces it. On the other hand, if rhetoric rejects this alignment, foundation, and orientation, it is condemned.

PLATO, 428-347 B.C.; PERSUASION (Psychology); JOURNALISTS; DIALECTIC; FORGERY; RHETORIC

DoisPontos, 2024, Vol 21, Issue 2, p84

1807-3883

Academic Journal

10.5380/dp.v21i2.94691