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- Title
Selecting Applicants.
- Authors
Frankel, Alex
- Abstract
A firm selects applicants to hire based on hard information, such as a test result, and soft information, such as a manager's evaluation of an interview. The contract that the firm offers to the manager can be thought of as a restriction on acceptance rates as a function of test results. I characterize optimal acceptance rate functions both when the firm knows the manager's mix of information and biases and when the firm is uncertain. These contracts may admit a simple implementation in which the manager can accept any set of applicants with a sufficiently high average test score.
- Subjects
TEST scoring; EXECUTIVES
- Publication
Econometrica, 2021, Vol 89, Issue 2, p615
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Academic Journal
- DOI
10.3982/ECTA15510