Peirce on the Normative Basis of Deductive Logic.

Finley, Robby

I analyze Peirce's reply in the 1903 Lowell Lectures to the "defendant argument" and show how his response provides a key to interpreting his later philosophy of logic and his views on the normative role of deductive logic in inquiry. I argue that in Peirce's discussion of self-control in reasoning and evaluation of reasoning, we find an underappreciated position on logical revision and how to understand rational choice between deductive theories. To defend this point, I reconstruct Peirce's reply by providing an interpretation of his comments on higher-order criticism and the soundness of our reasoning, arguing that the resulting position's ability to separate questions involving the role of logic in inquiry from questions better suited to the mathematical study of a logical theory provides a fruitful pragmatist reframing of problems in the epistemology of logic.

PEIRCE, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914; LOGIC; NORMATIVITY (Ethics); THEORY of knowledge; CRITICISM; ARGUMENT; SELF-control

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 2024, Vol 60, Issue 2, p129

0009-1774

Academic Journal

10.2979/csp.00024