Title: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information.
Authors: Bikhchandani, Sushil
Abstract: Multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer Most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player. This paper re-examines the bargaining model in Rubinstein (1985a, b) Monotonicity restrictions are placed on oft-the-equilibrium-path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures Sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized.
Subjects: COLLECTIVE bargaining; ECONOMIC equilibrium; BUSINESS negotiation; EQUILIBRIUM; BUSINESS planning; ECONOMETRIC models; MULTIPLICITY (Mathematics); BUSINESS
Publication: Review of Economic Studies, 1992, Vol 59, Issue 1, p187
ISSN: 0034-6527
Publication type: Academic Journal
DOI: 10.2307/2297933

A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information.

Bikhchandani, Sushil