Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players.

Michihiro Kandori

The present paper tries to explain cooperative behaviour in an organization run by a sequence of long-but finitely-Iived agents. We show that the Folk Theorem holds for infinitely repeated games with overlapping generations of finitely-lived players; any mutually beneficial outcome can approximately be sustained if the player's life span and the overlapping periods are long enough. The result is stronger than the usual Folk Theorems in that it employs no assumption on the stage game, such as the full dimensionality of payoff set or multiplicity of equilibria.

ORGANIZATION; ORGANIZATIONAL behavior; BEHAVIOR; ATHLETES; GAMES; MULTIPLICITY (Mathematics); EQUILIBRIUM; MATHEMATICS

Review of Economic Studies, 1992, Vol 59, Issue 1, p81

0034-6527

Academic Journal

10.2307/2297926