Results
Title

Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching.

Authors

Ellison, Glenn

Abstract

The paper considers the repeated prisoner's dilemma in a large-population random-matching setting where players are unable to recognize their opponents Despite the informational restrictions cooperation is still a sequential equilibrium supported by "contagious" punishments The equilibrium does not require excessive patience, and contrary to previous thought, need not be extraordinarily fragile It is robust to the introduction of small amounts of noise and remains nearly efficient Extensions are discussed to models with heterogeneous rates of time preference and without public randomizations.

Subjects

POPULATION; PRISONER'S dilemma game; COOPERATION; EQUILIBRIUM; NOISE; PATIENCE; PRISONERS

Publication

Review of Economic Studies, 1994, Vol 61, Issue 3, p567

ISSN

0034-6527

Publication type

Academic Journal

DOI

10.2307/2297904