Results
Title

柔性合同下交通PPP 再谈判行为抑制研究.

Authors

LV Jun-na; HE Yu-shuang; RAN Xiao-lan

Abstract

To inhibit the frequent occurrence of renegotiation in PPP transportation projects, the flexible contract clause is introduced into the initial PPP contract. Traffic volume fluctuation is used as a quantitative indicator to judge whether the social capitalist initiates renegotiation. The evolution law of private sector renegotiation behavior is studied by constructing an evolution game model. The renegotiation behaviors of the private sector are related to the change in traffic volume. We designed a flexible contract based on the risk-sharing of traffic demand and compared and analyzed the evolution of the renegotiation behaviors of the private sector in PPP transportation projects with and without the flexible contract. The results show that the flexible contract can make the private sector's strategy choice evolve toward not initiating renegotiation when the actual traffic volume is lower than expected, thus effectively inhibiting the renegotiation behavior of transportation PPP. The findings of the study can provide technical support for the design of flexible PPP contracts and the governance of renegotiation behavior of social capitalists.

Subjects

RENEGOTIATION; PRIVATE sector; GAME theory; TRAFFIC flow; INVESTORS

Publication

Journal of Engineering Management / Gongcheng Guanli Xuebao, 2021, Vol 35, Issue 6, p85

ISSN

1674-8859

Publication type

Academic Journal

DOI

10.13991/j.cnki.jem.2021.06.015