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Title

Representation in action.

Authors

Hinshelwood, Alec

Abstract

When one is intentionally doing something, one represents that thing as a goal to be accomplished. One represents it practically. How should we characterize this practical representation further? In this paper, I argue that when one is intentionally doing something, one's representation of it as a goal to be accomplished must also be knowledge that one is intentionally doing that thing. And I argue that this knowledge must itself be one's intentionally doing that thing. I aim to show, then, that insofar as representing practically just is knowing practically, it is equally acting intentionally.

Subjects

REPRESENTATION (Philosophy); INTENTIONALITY (Philosophy); THEORY of knowledge; AESTHETICS; PHILOSOPHY

Publication

European Journal of Philosophy, 2024, Vol 32, Issue 3, p690

ISSN

0966-8373

Publication type

Academic Journal

DOI

10.1111/ejop.12932