Euthanasia in human beings versus companion animals.

de Rijk, Shené Jheanne

This article argues in favour of voluntary active euthanasia in human beings on the grounds that we (society in general) perform euthanasia on valued companion animals when their suffering is considered great. I argue that suffering is a morally relevant criterion that should be considered in all cases (human and animal) of euthanasia. I further argue that human beings possess autonomy, a morally relevant difference to companion animals, that allows them to reason about their futures in a way that animals cannot, which gives us more reason to grant euthanasia, if requested autonomously by terminally ill patients who are experiencing extreme suffering. I consider objections around the sanctity of human life and sufficient palliation. I argue that neither of these objections give sufficient reason to deny competent human beings euthanasia if autonomously requested.

EUTHANASIA; PETS; HUMAN beings; TERMINALLY ill; FUTURES

South African Journal of Philosophy, 2024, Vol 43, Issue 1, p57

0258-0136

Academic Journal

10.1080/02580136.2023.2283675