Introduction: Double Intentionality.

Summa, Michela; Klein, Martin; Schmidt, Philipp

In the latter, we have a double intentionality not only in the sense of an interweaving of self-awareness and object-awareness (which is something that characterizes all acts), but also in the interplay of direct and indirect intentionality, or of I intentio recta i and I obliqua i (Brentano [11], pp. 219-220; cf. With this focus in mind, a constitutive feature of the medieval understanding of intentionality helps illuminate the framework within which a theory of double intentionality should be embedded and sheds light on both Brentano's concept of intentionality and the phenomenological concept of intentionality: that is, intentionality is a I relation i . The paradigm of double intentionality plays a more substantial role when it comes to Husserl's phenomenology of indirect emotions such as approval ( I Billigung i ) (Husserl [54], pp. 261-319). Remembering and Re-Presenting in Brentano and Husserl Brentano addresses the topic of the double intentionality of memory in the Appendix to his I Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint i (Brentano [11], pp. 214-215). On this understanding, we can still speak of double intentionality, but we also need to distinguish between an objectual and a non-objectual intentionality; in his analyses of time-consciousness, Husserl calls them transverse intentionality ( I Querintentionalität i ) and longitudinal intentionality ( I Längsintentionalität i ) respectively (Husserl [50], pp. 84-85, 379-380).[16] While transverse intentionality is directed at the temporal object, longitudinal intentionality is directed at the experiential process or flow.

ACT psychology; EMOTIONS; THEORY of knowledge; MOTIVATION (Psychology); SELF-consciousness (Awareness); COGNITIVE structures; PHILOSOPHY of mind

Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 2022, Vol 41, Issue 1, p93

0167-7411

Academic Journal

10.1007/s11245-021-09786-7