A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility.

McKenna, Michael

Is moral responsibility essentially historical? Consider two agents qualitatively identical with respect to all of their nonhistorical properties just prior to the act of A-ing. Is it possible that, due only to differences in their respective histories, when each A-s only one A-s freely and is morally responsible for doing so? Nonhistorical theorists say 'no.' Historical theorists say 'yes.' Elsewhere, I have argued on behalf of philosophers like Harry G. Frankfurt that nonhistorical theorists can resist the historical theorists' case against them, and that, therefore, a nonhistorical thesis remains a live option. Nevertheless, I have remained officially agnostic in this debate, as I acknowledge the pull of the competing considerations speaking on behalf of each view. In what follows, I turn from defending the nonhistorical position to fashioning a new historical theory, a relatively modest one that captures what is especially gripping about the kinds of examples that seem to commend an historical conclusion.

THEORISTS; FRANKFURT, Harry G.; ORGANIZATIONAL sociology; COMPARATIVE organization; COMPLEX organizations

Journal of Ethics, 2016, Vol 20, Issue 1-3, p83

1382-4554

Academic Journal

10.1007/s10892-016-9227-8