Do Statistical Laws Solve the 'Problem of Provisos'?

Reutlinger, Alexander

In their influential paper 'Ceteris Paribus, There is No Problem of Provisos', Earman and Roberts (Synthese 118:439-478, ) propose to interpret the non-strict generalizations of the special sciences as statistical generalizations about correlations. I call this view the 'statistical account'. Earman and Roberts claim that statistical generalizations are not qualified by 'non-lazy' ceteris paribus conditions. The statistical account is an attractive view, since it looks exactly like what everybody wants: it is a simple and intelligible theory of special science laws without the need for mysterious ceteris paribus conditions. I present two challenges to the statistical account. According to the first challenge, the statistical account does not get rid of so-called 'non-lazy' ceteris paribus conditions. This result undermines one of the alleged and central advantages of the statistical account. The second challenge is that the statistical account, qua general theory of special science laws, is weakened by the fact that idealized law statements resist a purely statistical interpretation.

STATISTICS; PHYSICAL laws; NEWTON'S second law of motion; PROBABILITY theory; PHILOSOPHY of science

Erkenntnis, 2014, Vol 79, Issue 10, p1759

0165-0106

Academic Journal

10.1007/s10670-014-9640-y