Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 2, p. 127, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0125-y
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- Publication type:
- Article
Works matching IS 14344742 AND DT 2005 AND VI 9 AND IP 2
Results: 6
1
2
Optimal money growth in a limited participation model with heterogeneous agents.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 2, p. 91, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0122-1
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- Publication type:
- Article
3
The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 2, p. 145, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z
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- Publication type:
- Article
4
Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 2, p. 109, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0123-0
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- Publication type:
- Article
5
Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 2, p. 167, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0126-x
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- Publication type:
- Article
6
The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes.
- Published in:
- Review of Economic Design, 2005, v. 9, n. 2, p. 73, doi. 10.1007/s10058-005-0121-2
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- Publication type:
- Article