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- Title
ARE THERE NON-EXISTENT INTENTIONALIA?
- Authors
Voltolini, Alberto
- Abstract
Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived of as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. While I take this metaphysical thesis to be correct, I cast doubt on whether it excludes intentionalia, especially non-existent ones, from the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think it does. There is a tension here, since Crane uses intentionalia in order to individuate intentional states, but at the same time attempts to dispense with them. If my doubts are grounded, the tension disappears.
- Subjects
INTENTIONALITY (Philosophy); OBJECT (Philosophy); CRANE, Tim; ENTITY (Philosophy); PHILOSOPHY
- Publication
Philosophical Quarterly, 2006, Vol 56, Issue 224, p436
- ISSN
0031-8094
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00451.x