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- Title
Large Contests.
- Authors
Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
- Abstract
We consider contests with many, possibly heterogeneous, players and prizes, and show that the equilibrium outcomes of such contests are approximated by the outcomes of mechanisms that implement the assortative allocation in an environment with a single agent that has a continuum of possible types. This makes it possible to easily approximate the equilibria of contests whose exact equilibrium characterization is complicated, as well as the equilibria of contests for which there is no existing equilibrium characterization.
- Subjects
CONTESTS; PRIZES (Contests &; competitions); APPROXIMATION theory; ECONOMIC equilibrium; GAME theory
- Publication
Econometrica, 2016, Vol 84, Issue 2, p835
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3982/ECTA11696