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- Title
Habitual Actions, Propositional Knowledge, Motor Representations and Intentionality.
- Authors
Ferretti, Gabriele; Zipoli Caiani, Silvano
- Abstract
Habitual actions have a history of practice and repetition that frees us from attending to what we are doing. Nevertheless, habitual actions seem to be intentional. What does account for the intentionality of habitual actions if they are automatically performed and controlled? In this paper, we address a possible response to a particular version of this issue, that is, the problem of understanding how the intention to execute a habitual action, which comes in a propositional format, interlocks with motor representations, which come in a motoric-pragmatic format. In order to solve this issue, we propose an account according to which the propositional intentions and the motor representations related to our habitual actions interlock through executable action concepts. This allows us to maintain that habitual actions can be, at the same time, automatically initiated, performed, and controlled and, still, intentional.
- Subjects
ACTION theory (Psychology)
- Publication
Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 2021, Vol 40, Issue 3, p623
- ISSN
0167-7411
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11245-020-09723-0