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- Title
CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS, BARGAINING POWER, AND GOVERNANCE INSEPARABILITY: INCORPORATING HISTORY INTO TRANSACTION COST THEORY.
- Authors
Argyres, Nicholas S.; Porter Liebskind, Julia
- Abstract
We extend transaction cost economics by arguing that prior contractual commitments made by a firm can limit its ability to differentiate or change its governance arrangements in the future--a condition we term governance inseparability. Changes in bargaining power between a firm and its exchange partners also can result in governance inseparability. Consequently, governance choice may be more particularistic than the current version of transaction cost economics allows. We provide several testable propositions.
- Subjects
CORPORATE governance; STRATEGIC alliances (Business); TRANSACTION costs; CONTRACTS; INTERORGANIZATIONAL relations; POWER (Social sciences); BUSINESS negotiation; INDUSTRIAL relations research; SOCIOECONOMICS; BOUNDED rationality; BEHAVIORAL economics; INDUSTRIAL organization (Economic theory); ORGANIZATIONAL structure; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Academy of Management Review, 1999, Vol 24, Issue 1, p49
- ISSN
0363-7425
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.5465/AMR.1999.1580440