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- Title
Preferences' Significance Does Not Depend on Their Content.
- Authors
Williams, Evan G.
- Abstract
Moral theories which include a preference-fulfillment aspect should not restrict their concern to some subset of people's preferences such as "now-for-now" preferences. Instead, preferences with all contents--e.g. ones which are external, diachronic, or even modal--should be taken into account. I offer a conceptualization of preferences and preference fulfillment which allows us to understand odd species of preferences, and I give a series of examples showing what it would mean to fulfill such preferences and why we ought to do so.
- Subjects
ETHICS; PREFERENCES (Philosophy); PSYCHOLOGY &; philosophy; EXPECTATION (Psychology); MOTIVATION (Psychology); AGENT (Philosophy)
- Publication
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2016, Vol 13, Issue 2, p211
- ISSN
1740-4681
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1163/17455243-4681064