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- Title
The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness.
- Authors
Klaus, Bettina; Bochet, Olivier
- Abstract
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, ) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller-Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, ) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new 'Muller-Satterthwaite preference domains' (e.g., Proposition 3).
- Subjects
MONOTONIC functions; EQUIVALENCE scales (Economics); MATHEMATICAL proofs; SOCIAL choice; MATHEMATICAL models; UNILATERAL contracts
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2013, Vol 40, Issue 1, p41
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6