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- Title
Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure.
- Authors
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
- Abstract
Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result that is related to Kakutani's fixed point theorem and that is an extension of Browder's fixed point theorem. The second proof shows that it is even possible to avoid the use of correspondences.
- Subjects
NONCOOPERATIVE games (Mathematics); ECONOMIC models; FIXED point theory; GAME theory; MATHEMATICAL models
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2000, Vol 15, Issue 2, p485
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s001990050024