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- Title
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object-Given Reasons.
- Authors
BOOTH, ANTHONY ROBERT
- Abstract
In this paper I discuss two claims; the first is the claim that state-given reasons for belief are of a radically different kind to object-given reasons for belief. The second is that, where this last claim is true, epistemic reasons are object-given reasons for belief (EOG). I argue that EOG has two implausible consequences: (i) that suspension of judgement can never be epistemically justified, and (ii) that the reason that epistemically justifies a belief that p can never be the reason for which one believes that p.
- Subjects
REASON; BELIEF &; doubt; EPISTEMIC logic; PHILOSOPHY; JUDGMENT (Logic)
- Publication
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 2014, Vol 89, Issue 1, p1
- ISSN
0031-8205
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00631.x