We found a match
Your institution may have rights to this item. Sign in to continue.
- Title
Against the very idea of a perceptual belief.
- Authors
Helton, Grace; Nanay, Bence
- Abstract
The aim of this paper is to argue that there is no unproblematic way of delineating perceptual beliefs from non‐perceptual beliefs. The concept of perceptual belief is one of the central concepts not only of philosophy of perception but also of epistemology in a broad foundationalist tradition. Philosophers of perception talk about perceptual belief as the interface between perception and cognition and foundationalist epistemologists understand perceptual justification as a relation between perceptual states and perceptual beliefs. I consider three ways of cashing out the difference between perceptual and non‐perceptual beliefs (semantic, justificatory, and etiological) and argue that none of them works. Finally, I explore the possibility of understanding perceptual justification without relying on the concept of perceptual beliefs.
- Subjects
PHILOSOPHERS; THEORY of knowledge; COGNITION; PERCEPTION (Philosophy); POSSIBILITY; VIRTUE epistemology
- Publication
Analytic Philosophy, 2023, Vol 64, Issue 2, p93
- ISSN
2153-9596
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phib.12277