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- Title
In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism.
- Authors
Sollberger, Michael
- Abstract
Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheaded or simply outdated. The reasons for its pariah status are variegated. Although it is surely not unreasonable to speculate that philosophical fashion is one factor that contributes to this situation, there are also solid philosophical arguments which put pressure on the indirect realist position. In this paper, I will discuss one such main objection and show how the indirect realist can face it. The upshot will be a defence of a new structural account of indirect realism which is immune to a number of objections that have been traditionally levelled at such theories of perceptual consciousness.
- Subjects
REALISM; SENSORY perception; OBJECTIONS (Evidence); REALISTIC conflict theory; PARIAHS
- Publication
European Journal of Philosophy, 2015, Vol 23, Issue 4, p815
- ISSN
0966-8373
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ejop.12015