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- Title
Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.
- Authors
Amaya, Santiago
- Abstract
This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally φs only if the person intends to φ. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman’s classic argument (Bratman in Philos Rev 93(3):375-405; Intentions, plans, and practical reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge <xref>1987</xref>) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the view, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.
- Subjects
INTENTION (Logic); THEORY of knowledge; DECISION making; CRITICAL thinking; ETHICS
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2018, Vol 175, Issue 7, p1767
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-017-0934-1