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- Title
Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief.
- Authors
Chislenko, Eugene
- Abstract
G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: 'It's raining, but I don't believe it.' This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe, and has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic's Paradox, analogous to Moore's paradox and centered on sentences such as: 'I believe it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it.' I then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy, arguing both that akratic belief does not require belief-akratic-paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for an understanding of both Moorean and akratic belief.
- Subjects
PARADOX; BELIEF &; doubt; ANALOGY; ARGUMENT; COMPREHENSION
- Publication
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 2016, Vol 92, Issue 3, p669
- ISSN
0031-8205
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phpr.12127