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- Title
An Advantage for Survival Between Altruism and Envy with Strategic Interactions.
- Authors
Sung-Hoon Park
- Abstract
We examined the evolutionary stability of preferences (altruism and envy) in an evolutionary game that infinitely repeats a stage game. In the stage game, players who survived the previous game compete for survival in pairs. By solving the evolutionary game, we show that the survival advantage between altruism and envy depends on whether players' efforts in the stage game are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic complements, altruistic players have an advantage in survival. With strategic substitutes, envious players have advantages.
- Subjects
ALTRUISM; VIDEO game development; ECONOMIC development; ECONOMISTS; STRATEGIC planning
- Publication
SAGE Open, 2024, Vol 14, Issue 2, p1
- ISSN
2158-2440
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1177/21582440241259027