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- Title
The Unity of Normative Thought.
- Abstract
Practical cognitivism is the view that practical reason is our will, not an intellectual capacity whose exercises can influence those of our will. If practical reason is our will, thoughts about how I am to act have an essential tie to action. They are intentions. Thoughts about how others are to act, though, lack such a tie to action. They are beliefs, not intentions. How, then, can these thoughts form a unified class? I reject two answers which deny the differences between such thoughts about myself and those about others, one of which says that all such thoughts are intentions, the other that all are beliefs. I then reject a shared assumption which says that a class of those is unified only if all its elements are all of one type of thought. I instead argue that this class is unified even though some elements are intentions, others beliefs, because such beliefs depend on those intentions in various ways.
- Subjects
COGNITIVE psychology; HUMAN beings; DELUSIONS; INTENTION; CRITICAL analysis
- Publication
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 2022, Vol 104, Issue 3, p639
- ISSN
0031-8205
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phpr.12798