We found a match
Your institution may have rights to this item. Sign in to continue.
- Title
Subgame Perfection in Positive Recursive Games with Perfect Information.
- Authors
Flesch, J.; Kuipers, J.; Schoenmakers, G.; Vrieze, K.
- Abstract
We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player; (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every nonabsorbing state; (3) the payoffs are nonnegative in every absorbing state. We propose a new iterative method to analyze these games. With respect to the expected average reward, we prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies for every ε > 0. Moreover, if all transitions are deterministic, we obtain a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
- Subjects
GAMES; RECURSIVE functions; ITERATIVE methods (Mathematics); EQUILIBRIUM; STOCHASTIC analysis
- Publication
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2010, Vol 35, Issue 1, p192
- ISSN
0364-765X
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1287/moor.1090.0437