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- Title
Self-Policing Statutes: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs?
- Authors
Guerrero, Santiago; Innes, Robert
- Abstract
State-level statutes provide firms that engage in environmental self-audits, and that self-report their environmental violations, a variety of regulatory rewards, including “immunity” from penalties and “privilege” for information contained in self-audits. This article studies a panel of state-level industries from 1989 through 2003, to determine the effects of the different types of statutes on toxic pollution and government inspections. We find that, by encouraging self-auditing, privilege protections tend to reduce pollution and government enforcement activity; however, sweeping immunity protections, by reducing firms’ pollution prevention incentives, raise toxic pollution and government inspection oversight.
- Subjects
UNITED States; POLLUTION laws; STATE statutes (United States); GOVERNMENT regulation &; economics; POLLUTION prevention laws; ENVIRONMENTAL law; PRIVILEGES &; immunities (Law); AUDITING; FINES (Penalties); STATE laws
- Publication
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 2013, Vol 29, Issue 3, p608
- ISSN
8756-6222
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/jleo/ewr012