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- Title
There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.
- Abstract
Is there a distinctively epistemic kind of blame? It has become commonplace for epistemologists to talk about epistemic blame, and to rely on this notion for theoretical purposes. But not everyone is convinced. Some of the most compelling reasons for skepticism about epistemic blame focus on disanologies, or asymmetries, between the moral and epistemic domains. In this paper, I defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. I do so primarily by developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame. My account draws on a prominent line of theorizing in moral philosophy that ties blame to our relationships with one another. I argue that with my account of epistemic blame on hand, the most compelling worries about epistemic blame can be deflated. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.
- Subjects
THEORY of knowledge; SKEPTICISM; AGNOSTICISM; EMPIRICISM; FREE thought
- Publication
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 2021, Vol 103, Issue 3, p518
- ISSN
0031-8205
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phpr.12726