We found a match
Your institution may have rights to this item. Sign in to continue.
- Title
Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen's Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?
- Authors
Villena, Mauricio G.; Villena, Marcelo J.
- Abstract
This article attempts to link the work of Thorstein Veblen on evolutionary economics with the recently developed approach of biological game theory, or evolutionary game theory (EGT) as it is best known within economics. EGT is a formal, mathematical approach within evolutionary economics, which thus far has been mainly applied to economics as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. As a result of reviewing EGT with each of the key features of Veblen's evolutionary framework, we conclude that EGT is indeed consistent with Veblen's proposals and thus may be considered to be a Veblenian evolutionary approach. However, EGT is not without its problems and limitations. Some researchers have put forward a number of criticisms of EGT which must be taken into account if this tool is to be successfully applied in economics. For example, applying EGT to social environments requires a clearer interpretation of fitness. While fitness in economics is typically associated with monetary payoffs, it is sometimes not so clear that profit represents the best basis for an evolutionary analysis. For instance, differential growth rates or bankruptcy considerations may better represent fitness in the context of industrial competition. Moreover, some authors claim that a more flexible framework is needed to formulate a true theory of social or cultural evolution; the usual linear function related to individual fitness has been criticized as being too restrictive.
- Subjects
VEBLEN, Thorstein, 1857-1929; EVOLUTIONARY economics; ECONOMICS; ECONOMIC equilibrium; GAME theory
- Publication
Journal of Economic Issues (Association for Evolutionary Economics), 2004, Vol 38, Issue 3, p585
- ISSN
0021-3624
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1080/00213624.2004.11506721