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- Title
A priori intuition and transcendental necessity in Kant's idealism.
- Abstract
I examine how Kant argues for the transcendental ideality of space. I defend a reading on which Kant accepts the ideality of space because it explains our (actual) knowledge that mathematical judgments are necessarily true. I argue that this reading is preferable over the alternative suggestion that Kant can infer the ideality of space directly from the fact that we have an a priori intuition of space. Moreover, I argue that the reading I propose does not commit Kant to incoherent modal views. If we carefully distinguish between different senses of modality, the fact that our spatial form of intuition is (in some sense) contingent does not undermine the claim that this form can explain how our mathematical judgments are (in some sense) necessary.
- Subjects
INTUITION; KANTIAN ethics; TRANSCENDENCE (Philosophy); IDEALISM; MODALITY (Theory of knowledge)
- Publication
European Journal of Philosophy, 2021, Vol 29, Issue 4, p827
- ISSN
0966-8373
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ejop.12607