We found a match
Your institution may have rights to this item. Sign in to continue.
- Title
Richard Nixon Administration's Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1969-1974).
- Authors
Buzan, V.
- Abstract
The article explores U.S. policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict during Richard Nixon's presidency, emphasizing the formulation of the American strategy's conceptual foundations and the Cold War's influence on decisionmaking. The author scrutinizes the concerns and discussions among top American officials and policymakers shaping U.S. policy in this period, and highlights the bureaucratic debates within the Nixon administration regarding the Middle East. Between 1969 and 1971, the U.S. endeavored to broker a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, initiating diplomatic efforts like the Rogers Plan in 1969. Following its failure, U.S. policy shifted towards seeking partial or interim resolutions. The article documents critical strategies, including proposals for force disengagement along the Suez Canal and efforts to diminish Soviet involvement post the October War in 1973, pivoting to a role of solitary mediator through step-by-step and shuttle diplomacy. The author reveals that initially, the State Department was pivotal in formulating policies towards the conflict, endorsing an impartial approach to foster diplomacy in the Middle East. A substantial part of the analysis is dedicated to scrutinizing Henry Kissinger's strategy, characterized by viewing the Middle East through the lens of superpower confrontation and aiming to enhance U.S. influence in the peace process. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry over the Arab-Israeli conflict and U.S. perceptions of Soviet intentions in the region are explored thoroughly, including the efforts in the early 1970's to agree upon general principles for an Arab-Israeli settlement. The primary goal of U.S. policy was reducing Soviet influence in the Middle East. The article also delves into U.S. policy during the 1973 October War, illustrating the U.S. interest in an Israeli victory, albeit without a complete Arab defeat to maintain its standing in the Arab world and curb the risk of Soviet intervention. It discusses U.S. endeavors to foster conditions conducive to a diplomatic breakthrough post-war, including military aid to Israel and leveraging its role in the UN Security Council. In conclusion, the author argues that the U.S. aimed to prevent the 1973 October War from escalating into a broader international crisis, steering clear of direct superpower confrontation. It reviews the diplomatic maneuvers involving the Soviets to end hostilities and the U.S.' refusal to the Soviet proposition of deploying troops to Egypt, alongside the preventative nuclear alert initiated to dissuade Soviet intervention in the Middle East. The article underlines U.S. efforts to mediate the crisis and its advocacy for UN observer deployment to uphold the cease-fire.
- Subjects
MIDDLE East; SOVIET Union; ARAB-Israeli peace process; WAR; PEACE negotiations; COLD War, 1945-1991; MILITARY assistance; ARAB-Israeli conflict
- Publication
History Pages, 2023, Vol 56, p316
- ISSN
2307-5244
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.20535/2307-5244.56.2023.288787