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- Title
Building An Institutional Theory of Regulation.
- Authors
Kling, Robert W.
- Abstract
Any theory holds extra value if it offers normative ramifications, inspiration for appropriate action. Institutionalists, with a long record of activism in the formation of social policy, have a special interest in developing the practical implications of the theory. The idea that advances in communications technology leads to improved forms of explicit regulation has a distinctly optimistic tone to it, one that is not necessarily justified. Information does not always lead to understanding, and a deluge of data does not forcibly give the public interest increased political expressiveness. Furthermore, private interest groups can gain the same advantages from the information technology as public interest groups, so the net gain may not always be for the public. The ambiguity of the result points out the need for activism on the part of those with the responsibility for guiding policy and manipulating public opinion. Economist Larry Reynolds has suggested a broad but relevant prescription for more effective regulatory policy: "to change the form of explicit regulations and allow implicit regulations to evolve to a form more consistent with the equity and efficiency goals of individuals in society. This requires a dynamic theory of institutional change and the evolution of behavioral patterns."
- Subjects
DELEGATED legislation; INSTITUTIONAL economics; SOCIAL history; TRADE regulation; ECONOMICS; SOCIAL policy; COMMUNICATION &; technology; MARKETS; PUBLIC interest; REYNOLDS, Larry; ECONOMISTS
- Publication
Journal of Economic Issues (Association for Evolutionary Economics), 1988, Vol 22, Issue 1, p197
- ISSN
0021-3624
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1080/00213624.1988.11504740