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- Title
The role of pragmatics in (re)constructing the rational law-maker.
- Authors
Capone, Alessandro
- Abstract
The recent debate on pragmatics and the law has found ways to circumvent an important distinction, originally drawn by Dascal and Wróblewski (1991), between the historical law-maker, the current law-maker, and the ideal/rational law-maker. By insisting on the relationship between the rational law-maker and contextualism and textualism (see Manning 2005, 2006), I want to redress this fault in current discussions. In this paper, I start with general considerations on pragmatics, intentionality in ordinary conversation, and intentionality in the context of judiciary proceedings and legal texts. I then move on to considerations on rationality as a prerequisite for understanding the law and on the rational law-maker, an ideal construct proposed by Dascal and Wróblewski (1991). I argue that contextualism (of the moderate kind) is the best way to carry out the program by Dascal and Wróblewski on interpretation and the rational lawmaker (also see considerations by Fish 2005); (on contextualism see Dascal and Weizman 1987). I argue that bearing in mind the rational law-maker postulated by Dascal and Wróblewski is a guidance to interpretation of statutes whose texts create interpretative difficulties. I conclude by saying that the considerations on the rational law-maker constitute a compromise between Scalia's (1997) textualism and contextualism (see Manning 2005, 2006 on the divide between textualism and contextualism).
- Subjects
PRAGMATICS; CONTEXT effects (Psychology); LEGISLATORS; COMPROMISE (Ethics); CONVERSATION
- Publication
Pragmatics & Cognition, 2013, Vol 21, Issue 2, p399
- ISSN
0929-0907
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1075/pc.21.2.08cap