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- Title
The Limits of Deterrence Theory.
- Authors
Kolodziej, Edward A.
- Abstract
The article comments on article of Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein entitled "Beyond Deterrence," which is about the theory of deterrence and nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union. As Lebow and Stein demonstrate, case analysis identifies several more layers of political, psychological and operational factors that explains deterrence failure more persuasively. They highlighted the hazards of attributing too much to deterrence. An adversary's behavior may well be explained by factors other than one's own deterrent moves. Conversely, policies pursued in the name of deterrence, increased spending on defense, deployment of forces, may, at best, be benign, having no appreciable effect on an adversary, whatever may be the waste of resources in witless pursuit of deterrence. Worse, a deterrer's moves may precipitate a military buildup by an opponent or prompt an armed clash. Among the most innovative features of the Lebow and Stein's approach, is the emphasis on reassurance strategies to address an adversary's real or perceived feelings of vulnerability rather than to assume the adversary is fixed narrowly on strategies to exploit opportunities and gain advantages at the expense of the deterrer.
- Subjects
UNITED States; SOVIET Union; DETERRENCE (Military strategy); NUCLEAR crisis stability; MILITARY psychology; INTERNATIONAL relations; NATIONAL security; BALANCE of power; POLITICAL science
- Publication
Journal of Social Issues, 1987, Vol 43, Issue 4, p123
- ISSN
0022-4537
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1540-4560.1987.tb00262.x