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- Title
Identification and Estimation in Many‐to‐One Two‐Sided Matching Without Transfers.
- Authors
He, YingHua; Sinha, Shruti; Sun, Xiaoting
- Abstract
In a setting of many‐to‐one two‐sided matching with nontransferable utilities, for example, college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified with data on one single market. Regardless of whether the market is centralized or decentralized, assuming that the observed matching is stable, we show nonparametric identification of preferences of both sides under certain exclusion restrictions. To take our results to the data, we use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate different estimators, including the ones that are directly constructed from the identification. We find that a parametric Bayesian approach with a Gibbs sampler works well in realistically sized problems. Finally, we illustrate our methodology in decentralized admissions to public and private schools in Chile and conduct a counterfactual analysis of an affirmative action policy.
- Subjects
CHILE; AFFIRMATIVE action programs in education; UNIVERSITY &; college admission; MONTE Carlo method; GIBBS sampling; AFFIRMATIVE action programs; PRIVATE schools
- Publication
Econometrica, 2024, Vol 92, Issue 3, p749
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3982/ECTA19636