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- Title
Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.
- Authors
Thorpe, Joshua Rowan
- Abstract
Putnam's vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or conclusion of the argument that beg the question against the sceptic. In this paper, I show that this idea is mistaken.
- Subjects
SEMANTICS; THEORY of self-knowledge; SKEPTICISM; THEORY of knowledge; PHILOSOPHY of mind; PUTNAM, Hilary, 1926-2016
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2019, Vol 176, Issue 9, p2289
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-018-1126-3