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- Title
HORIZONTAL MERGERS WITH CAPITAL ADJUSTMENT: WORKERS' COOPERATIVES AND THE MERGER PARADOX.
- Authors
DELBONO, Flavio; LAMBERTINI, Luca
- Abstract
ABSTRACT We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. We focus on workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment-constrained profit maximizers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately efficient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially efficient if market size is large enough, even in the case of merger to monopoly.
- Subjects
ITALY; HORIZONTAL merger; MONOPOLIES; COOPERATIVE societies; CONSTRUCTION industry; BUSINESS planning
- Publication
Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics, 2016, Vol 87, Issue 4, p529
- ISSN
1370-4788
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/apce.12125