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- Title
Perceptual experience and seeing that $$p$$.
- Authors
French, Craig
- Abstract
I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this-states of seeing that $$p$$-appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents-a Propositional View-has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $$p$$. And thus we can't sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that $$p$$, a non-propositional view of seeing that $$p$$ is, I argue, perfectly intelligible.
- Subjects
VISUAL perception; PROPOSITIONAL attitudes; REPRESENTATION (Philosophy); RELATION (Philosophy); SYNTHESIS (Philosophy); EXPERIENCE
- Publication
Synthese, 2013, Vol 190, Issue 10, p1735
- ISSN
0039-7857
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11229-013-0259-3