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- Title
Evolutionary fate of memory-one strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations.
- Authors
Liu, Xu-Sheng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Chen, Michael; Guan, Jian-Yue
- Abstract
We study evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game involving a one-step memory mechanism of the individuals whenever making strategy updating. In particular, during the process of strategy updating, each individual keeps in mind all the outcome of the action pairs adopted by himself and each of his neighbors in the last interaction, and according to which the individuals decide what actions they will take in the next round. Computer simulation results imply that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy win out of the memory-one strategy set in the stationary state. This result is robust in a large range of the payoff parameter, and does not depend on the initial state of the system. Furthermore, theoretical analysis with mean field and quasi-static approximation predict the same result. Thus, our studies suggest that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy is a stable dominant strategy in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in homogeneous structured populations.
- Subjects
PRISONER'S dilemma game; GAME theory; CHOICE (Psychology); COMPUTER simulation; QUASISTATIC processes
- Publication
European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter, 2017, Vol 90, Issue 7, p1
- ISSN
1434-6028
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1140/epjb/e2017-80219-0